By Peter Obi

I have remained silent over the past few days because I have been grieving the loss of my very dear elder brother and friend, Chief Okey Ezeibe. However, the time has come for me to address some of the matters that have occupied public discussion in recent days.

I respectfully urge everyone to concentrate on the existential challenges confronting Nigeria and the hardships endured by its citizens, rather than on the needless distractions that have become widespread in our politics.

I wish to assure the public that I have no disagreement with my dear elder brother, Governor Soludo, or with any governor in Nigeria. I am not seeking the office of governor in any state, and I will not seek that position again, even if the Constitution is amended.

Accordingly, I appeal to governors to support whichever presidential candidate they choose while also permitting and assisting other presidential candidates and contenders for other offices to campaign freely and without interruption in their states. Ultimately, voters should be allowed to determine whom they wish to serve them.

Regarding the multilateral funding inaccurately described as “debt owed by Peter Obi” in Anambra State, I wish to state unequivocally:

As Governor of Anambra State, I did not approach any financial institution to borrow funds or issue a bond on behalf of the state. Indeed, at his farewell ceremony, the then Director-General of the DMO, Abraham Nwankwo, appointed me chairman and declared that, during his 10 years in office, I was the only state governor who had not approached him for a loan facility.

When I left office, the Anambra State Government owed no unpaid salaries, gratuities, or pensions. Neither did it owe any contractor or supplier who had completed work that the government had verified and certified.

Regarding development financing from the World Bank, these are concessionary development-support funds secured by the Federal Government for states selected by it to address specific needs. Repayment is spread over 25 to 30 years.

The Anambra State Government must therefore differentiate among three separate figures: the total amount approved for the multiyear development program; the amount Anambra State actually drew during my tenure; and the funding balance outstanding when I handed over on 17 March 2014.

The government has combined these distinct categories, added them together, and described the resulting US$123.77 million as “loans left by Peter Obi.” That is an incorrect application of public-sector accounting.

The eight facilities identified were primarily World Bank and IFAD development programs negotiated by the Federal Government, with participating states receiving access to the funds through subsidiary arrangements. They were not conventional commercial loans that I personally secured during my tenure.

This does not suggest that Anambra had no repayment responsibilities; rather, each facility must be examined in light of its approval, effectiveness, drawdown, and repayment record.

The clearest contradiction appears in the government’s own figures. It states that the original facilities amounted to approximately US$123.77 million and that US$92.35 million remained outstanding in June 2026. However, the DMO’s published records showed Anambra’s total external debt at approximately US$18 million when I began my tenure in March 2006, about US$30 million in March 2014, when I left office, and approximately US$45.15 million as of 31 December 2014, nine months after my departure.

The Anambra State Government must therefore clarify how a state whose recorded external debt was about US$30 million in March 2014 and US$45.15 million in December 2014 could supposedly have inherited US$123.77 million from Peter Obi, who left office in March of that same year.

On the day I left office, I left more than US$150 million as the dollar component of my investment in Anambra State as governor. I hereby provide documents that can be verified with the various banks. Had it remained untouched, this investment was expected to provide Anambra State with approximately US$10 million in annual income.

Even if their assertion were accurate—which it is not—that Anambra owed US$123 million, the government could have used the US$10 million generated annually from my savings to reduce the debt. It has now been 13 years since I left office, which would amount to US$130 million. The debt should have been fully settled by now.

Had they retained the funds I left in the bank, including the compound interest on the principal and the additional income, the total would be approximately US$335 million today. If they had chosen to repay the US$92.35 million funding, the entire amount would have been covered, leaving approximately US$242 million to be reinvested. That sum would have generated about US$20 million annually for Anambra State.

Let me reiterate that, when I left office, I left Anambra State in a strong financial position—the strongest of any state in Nigeria—and I stand by that position.

Through this clarification, I wish to state categorically that I will neither engage nor trade words with anyone regarding my tenure in Anambra State. My focus will now be on issues affecting the suffering Nigerian masses, which is the reason for my presidential ambition.

A new Nigeria is POssible. -PO

Opinion 2

SUPREME COURT, PARTY REGISTERS, DECAMPEES AND DUAL PARTY MEMBERSHIP: WHAT IS THE LAW?

By Chief. J.D.Ephraim.

The recent decision of the Supreme Court upholding the appeal of the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) and restoring Sections 77(5), 77(6), 77(7) and 84(2) of the Electoral Act 2026 has potentially significant consequences for politicians who moved from one political party to another in the course of preparing for the 2027 elections.
The central issue is not simply whether a politician has defected from Party A to Party B. The more important question is:
Was his or her name contained in Party B’s membership register submitted to INEC within the period prescribed by law before Party B’s nomination exercise?
The Supreme Court’s decision makes the answer to that question legally significant.

1. WHAT EXACTLY DID THE SUPREME COURT RESTORE?

The Supreme Court, on 24 September 2026, set aside the Court of Appeal decision which had invalidated the relevant provisions of the Electoral Act 2026.
The apex court upheld the validity of Sections 77(5), 77(6), 77(7) and 84(2), holding that they are not inconsistent with the 1999 Constitution.
Section 77(5) provides, in substance, that only members whose names are contained in the membership register submitted to INEC not later than 21 days before the date fixed for the party’s primaries, congresses or conventions are eligible to vote.
Section 77(6) goes further by prohibiting a political party from using a membership register other than the one submitted to INEC for its primaries, congresses and conventions.
Section 77(7) provides that a political party which fails to submit its membership register within the prescribed period shall not be eligible to field a candidate for the election.
Therefore, these are no longer merely administrative guidelines. They are statutory requirements which the Supreme Court has now confirmed as constitutionally valid.

2. WHAT THEN IS THE POSITION OF A POLITICIAN WHO DEFECTED AFTER THE REGISTER HAD BEEN SUBMITTED?

This is where the law becomes quite serious.
Suppose:

Mr A is a member of Party X;

Party Y submits its membership register to INEC;

Mr A’s name is not on Party Y’s register;

thereafter, Mr A leaves Party X and joins Party Y;

Party Y subsequently conducts a direct primary.

Can Mr A participate in Party Y’s primary?
On the face of Section 77(5), the answer is no.
His subsequent membership of Party Y does not retrospectively insert his name into the membership register which Party Y had already submitted to INEC.
The statutory test is not merely:

“Is he now a member of Party Y?”

It is:

“Was his name contained in the register submitted to INEC within the statutory period?”

If it was not, he cannot rely upon a subsequent defection to satisfy Section 77(5).
That is precisely why the Supreme Court decision is potentially consequential for politicians who changed parties after the relevant registers had been submitted.

3. WHAT IF THE PERSON DEFECTED BEFORE THE REGISTER WAS SUBMITTED?

That is different.
If Mr A left Party X, properly joined Party Y, and his name was included in Party Y’s membership register submitted to INEC within the statutory period, Section 77(5) would not, on its face, create the same problem.
The important date is therefore not simply the date of defection.
It is the relationship between:
(a) the date of joining the new party;
(b) the date the new party submitted its membership register to INEC; and
(c) the date of the primary, congress or convention.
This is why every alleged “late defection” must be examined individually rather than treated as a general political question.

4. BUT THERE IS AN IMPORTANT DISTINCTION: PRIMARY AND CONSENSUS

This is where the matter becomes legally interesting.
Section 84(2) of the Electoral Act 2026 provides that political parties shall nominate candidates through either:

direct primaries; or

consensus.

The Supreme Court has now upheld that provision as constitutionally valid.
Section 77(5) expressly speaks about eligibility to participate in primaries, congresses and conventions.
The question therefore arises:
Does the restriction in Section 77(5) operate in exactly the same way where a party chooses a consensus candidate rather than conducting a primary?
This is not a question that should be answered casually.
There is a respectable argument that the statutory language of Section 77 is specifically directed at participation in primaries, congresses and conventions, whereas consensus operates under the separate provisions governing consensus nomination.
Indeed, Section 87 of the Electoral Act requires a party adopting consensus to obtain the written consent of all cleared aspirants, indicating their voluntary withdrawal and endorsement of the consensus candidate.
Consequently, the legal position of a person who was not on the submitted membership register but is subsequently adopted through a consensus process may present a different question from that of a person who seeks to vote or be voted for in a direct primary.
That issue should not be automatically collapsed into the Section 77(5) rule.

5. THERE IS ANOTHER QUESTION: CAN A POLITICAL PARTY SIMPLY ADMIT A DECAMPER AFTER SUBMISSION OF ITS REGISTER?

Party membership and eligibility to participate in a statutory nomination exercise are not necessarily the same thing.
A political party may have its own constitutional and membership procedures for admitting new members.
But the fact that a person has become a member after the register has been submitted does not automatically give that person the statutory right to participate in the particular primary for which the register has already been closed.
In other words:
Membership is one question. Eligibility to participate in a particular nomination exercise is another.
This distinction is critical.

6. WHAT IF THE PERSON’S NAME APPEARS IN THE REGISTERS OF TWO PARTIES?

This is the second and even more interesting question raised in the original post.
There has been a legislative move to criminalise dual membership.
The proposed amendment to Section 77 would provide that:

a person shall not be registered as a member of more than one political party at the same time.

It would further provide that where dual registration is established, the memberships would be void pending regularisation, and that a person who knowingly registers or maintains membership in more than one party could face a fine of ₦10 million, imprisonment for two years, or both.
However, there is an important qualification.
I have not found authoritative evidence that this proposed Section 77(8)-(10) amendment has received presidential assent and become part of the operative Electoral Act as at 25 September 2026.
The available legislative/legal sources still describe it as an amendment/proposal requiring further legislative steps. PLAC, for example, reported that the amendment was awaiting Senate concurrence and, if passed, would then go to the President for assent.
Therefore, it would be legally unsafe to say today that the ₦10 million/two-year imprisonment provision is already an enforceable offence under the Electoral Act 2026.

7. BUT IF A PERSON IS ACTUALLY ON TWO PARTY REGISTERS, THAT IS A SERIOUS LEGAL PROBLEM

Even apart from the proposed criminal penalty, the factual situation is problematic.
There is a fundamental difference between:
DEFECTING
and
BELONGING TO TWO PARTIES SIMULTANEOUSLY.
A lawful defection ordinarily means:

I leave Party A and join Party B.

That is not the same thing as:

I remain registered as a member of Party A while simultaneously registering as a member of Party B.

The second situation creates a question of dual membership and the validity of the person’s participation in party activities.
The proposed amendment was clearly designed to address precisely this problem.

8. THERE IS ALSO A CRUCIAL QUESTION OF INTENTION

The proposed provision uses the word “knowingly.”
That is important.
There can be situations in which a politician has formally resigned from one party and joined another, but his name remains on an old party register because of administrative failure, delay or failure by the former party to update its records.
That is legally different from a person deliberately maintaining simultaneous membership in two parties.
The proposed amendment itself recognises this distinction by attaching criminal liability to someone who knowingly registers or maintains membership in more than one party.
Therefore, before accusing a politician of unlawful dual membership, one should establish:

whether the person’s name actually appears on both registers;

the dates on which the registers were compiled;

whether the person had formally resigned from the first party;

whether the person subsequently registered with the second party;

whether the apparent duplication resulted from administrative failure; and

whether the relevant anti-dual-membership amendment was actually in force at the material time.

9. THE REAL LEGAL DANGER FOR 2027

The Supreme Court judgment has made the party membership register much more important.
A politician cannot simply say:

“I have joined the party, therefore I am automatically entitled to contest its primary.”

That proposition is no longer safe.
The first question will be:
Was his or her name on the party’s INEC-submitted register within the statutory period?
If the answer is no, participation in the direct primary is vulnerable to challenge under Section 77(5).
And Section 77(6) makes it even more difficult for the party to cure the problem by simply producing another or supplementary register for the primary, because the Act prohibits the use of a different register for the relevant exercise.

10. BUT ONE SHOULD NOT GO TOO FAR

It would be incorrect to conclude that:

“Every politician who defected after the register was submitted is automatically disqualified from contesting an election.”

That is broader than what Section 77(5) says.
The provision directly addresses eligibility to participate in the relevant party primary, congress or convention.
The precise consequences for a particular candidate will depend on:

the date of defection;

the date of registration in the new party;

the date the party submitted its register to INEC;

the method of nomination adopted by the party;

whether the person participated in a primary;

whether consensus was used;

the party’s constitution and guidelines;

the statutory nomination timetable; and

whether a competent person challenges the nomination within the applicable legal framework.

The law therefore requires a case-by-case examination.

CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court has unquestionably strengthened the legal importance of the party membership register.
The position can be reduced to four propositions:
FIRST: A person whose name was not contained in Party B’s membership register submitted to INEC within the statutory period cannot simply rely on a subsequent defection to participate in Party B’s direct primary.
SECOND: A party cannot simply substitute another membership register for the one submitted to INEC in order to accommodate persons who were not on the original register.
THIRD: The position concerning a consensus candidate requires separate analysis because Section 84(2) expressly recognises consensus as a distinct method of nomination and Section 87 contains its own requirements.
FOURTH: Dual registration in two political parties is a separate issue from defection. A person who has genuinely left Party A and joined Party B is not necessarily a dual member merely because Party A’s administrative records still contain his name. The critical issue is whether the person knowingly maintained simultaneous membership.
And there is one final caution:
The proposed criminalisation of dual party membership should not presently be confused with the Supreme Court’s decision on Sections 77(5)-(7) and 84(2). They are related subjects, but they arise from different legal provisions.
The Supreme Court judgment has settled the constitutionality and enforceability of the membership-register requirements. It has not, by itself, created a new criminal offence of dual party membership.
That distinction is essential.
In simple terms:

Defection is not the problem. The problem is whether the defection occurred early enough to satisfy the statutory membership-register requirements for the nomination exercise, and whether the person is simultaneously maintaining membership of another political party.

That is where the real legal battle may now begin ahead of the 2027 elections.