The decision of the Federal Government to transition Nigeria from centralized to a multilayer policing has prompted extensive national debate in the last few weeks. The massive interest and panoramic conversation that the proposal has generated is not surprising given that Nigerians have hardly slept with both eyes closed as a result of pervasive insecurity plaguing the country for over a decade.

While most Nigerians subscribe to the idea of State Police, not a few have expressed dissent out of fear of possible hijack and abuse by political actors leading to unpleasant consequences. This fear is neither unreal nor untenable. After all, which institution, policy or program in Nigeria has not been state-captured, subjected to flagrant abuse and manipulated? Nigeria remains a toddler nation after 65 years post independence basically because of weak institutions in the hands of a dishonest political class. Why, dissenters ask, should we expect State Police to be different?

The corollary is that Nigeria will remain the killing field that it has turned into since the last decade if we capitulate for fear of possible abuse. It therefore becomes imperative that we collectively fashion out a practical implementable design with inbuilt safeguards to insulate State Police from extraneous influences, and not throw the baby with or because of the bath water. Who knows, this could provide the model after which we can begin to redesign other institutions to make them work for the benefit of all.

This model provides a practical, phased, and safeguard-heavy pathway designed specifically to limit capture by governors and the political class, while strengthening security, federalism, and civil liberties.

1. Guiding Design Principles (Non-Negotiables)

State Police system in Nigeria must be built on five hard principles:

1. Shared Control, Not Governor Control

No single individual—especially the governor—should control recruitment, funding, discipline, or deployment.

1. Clear Jurisdictional Separation

While State Police is responsible for routine policing, federal Police remain focused on:

• Terrorism
• Treason
• Inter-state crime
• Federal infrastructure and elections

1. Civilian Oversight with Judicial Teeth.

Oversight bodies must have enforceable powers, not advisory roles.

1. Financial Autonomy with Transparency

State Police funding must be insulated from arbitrary political withdrawal and adequately accounted for.

1. Constitutional Entrenchment of Safeguards.

Protections must be embedded in the Constitution—not left to statutes that governors can easily amend or manipulate.

2. Constitutional Architecture (Foundation Phase)

2.1 Constitutional Amendments

Sections 214–216 of the 1999 Constitution must be amended to:

1. Establish two (maybe three) layers of policing: Federal Police, State Police (and perhaps Local/Community Safety Corps (non-armed)
2. A chapter dealing with State Police Safeguards should be introduced, detailing: Independent appointment processes, Funding mechanisms, Oversight institutions and Federal intervention triggers.

1. 2 Critical Clause:

The following clause should also be included in the amendment,

“No State Police Service shall be subject to the direction or control of a Governor acting alone”, or however else it may be couched.

3. Institutional Design: How State Police Would Actually Work

3.1 State Police Service Commission (SPSC)

The Constitution shall establish for each state an independent State Police Service Commission, not controlled by the governor.

The Commission should typically be composed of:

1. Chairman: Retired High Court Justice, Retired High School Principal or Retired Permanent Secretary who must be elected using INEC (not State Electoral Commission) as the umpire
2. Representative of NBA (State Chapter)
3. Civil Society nominee
4. Traditional rulers’ representative
5. Town Union representative
6. Federal Police nominee
7. Human Rights Commission nominee

Besides the Chairman who shall be elected, the other members shall be appointed by the President (not the Governor). However, the President shall have NO power to discipline or dismiss members once appointed.

The Commission shall have power to:

1. Recruit, promote, discipline, and dismiss officers
2. Appoint State Commissioner of Police (SCP)
3. Approve annual operational plans

This means that the Governor has no role. He cannot hire, fire or deploy officers unilaterally

3.2 Appointment of State Commissioner of Police (SCP)

The appointment of the State Police Commissioner shall be by a multi-layered appointment process thus:

1. SPSC nominates 3 candidates who must be trained and experienced police officers with a minimum of a Masters degree in any field
2. Governor selects one
3. State House of Assembly confirms by ⅔ majority
4. NJC (or a body constituted at the federal level specifically for that purpose) conducts final integrity clearance

• Removal from office :

The State Police Commissioner shall be removed only by a ⅔ Assembly vote to be followed by a review by a federal judicial review panel

4. Jurisdictional Safeguards Against Abuse

4.1 Strict Jurisdiction Limits

The Constitution shall create limits thus:

State Police cannot:

1. Investigate political opponents
2. Handle election security
3. Enforce court orders involving political actors (Political actors will be defined with boundaries).
4. Operate outside state borders

Federal Police automatically take over when:

1. Political violence is alleged
2. Ethnic or religious conflict escalates
3. State Police disobeys court orders

4.2 Dual-Key Deployment System

Armed (Tactical Command) deployment requires two approvals:

1. State Police Commissioner, with approval from:
2. Independent Operations Board (IOB) to be composed of senior police officers in the state

This prevents governors from issuing midnight arrest orders.

5. Funding Structure to Prevent Political Blackmail

5.1 State Police Fund (SPF)

Funding sources:

1. Specified statutory percentage charge on state monthly allocation
2. A specified percentage of the monthly Internally Generated Revenue
3. Dedicated security levy (legislated)
4. Federal matching grants (conditional on human rights record and operational discipline)

Neither the Governor nor the State House of Assembly shall have power to withhold or obstruct the release of any portion of the funds. Punishment may include automatic impeachment and removal from office.

5.2 Independent Financial Oversight

1. The SPSC shall cause an annual audit of the finances of the State Police to be carried out by the State Auditor-General to be followed by a second audit by a reputable private audit firm. The Constitution will criminalize any form of interference or obstruction in course of these audits.

1. Quarterly public expenditure reports must be published by the Police finance department and submitted to the SPSC and the State Assembly. These reports must be made available to auditors on demand.
2. Legislative oversight hearings must be broadcast live monthly or quarterly.
3. Federal Backstop & Emergency Override

6.1 Federal Override Clause

President (with Senate approval) may:

1. Temporarily suspend State Police operations
2. Deploy Federal Police
3. Appoint interim administrator

Triggers include:

1. Widespread rights abuses
2. Defiance of court orders
3. Ethnic cleansing or political repression
4. Phased Implementation Roadmap

Phase 1(Years 1–2): Pilot States

1. 6 states (one per geopolitical zone) and the FCT meeting readiness criteria. Criteria must be clearly stated in the guideline to be produced by a special steering and Implementation committee to be set up by the President
2. Federal Police mentoring. Federal officers will be deployed to the states for a specified period

c)Joint command structures. Federal and State Police to operate side-by-side for a specified period of time

Phase 2 (Years 3–5): Gradual Expansion

1. Additional states come on board
2. Federal Police withdraw from routine policing

Phase 3 (Year 6 going forward): Full Two-Tier Policing

1. Clear division of labour
2. Strong inter-agency coordination
3. Human Rights & Accountability Mechanisms

8.1 Independent Police Complaints Tribunal

1. To be established under the Constitution. The President shall appoint for each state, an Independent Police Complaints Tribunal to be headed by a retired High Court Justice
2. Citizens can file complaints directly

The Tribunal shall have powers to:

1. Summon officers
2. Recommend prosecution
3. Order compensation
4. No orderly room (or secret) trial as is currently the case

8.2 Body Cameras & Digital Records

Officers of all ranks from constabulary to the State Police Commissioner must be provided with and required by law to ALWAYS:

1. Wear body cameras
2. Maintain a digital arrest register at the office
3. Keep all evidence in an Independent evidence storage
4. Preventing Ethnic & Partisan Capture

The law shall provide for:

1. Recruitment quotas reflecting state diversity
2. Prohibition of party officials in police governance
3. Mandatory inter-state postings for senior officers
4. Federal ethics certification every 3 years

10. Why This Model Can Work in Nigeria

1. Reduces overstretched Federal Police
2. Brings security closer to communities
3. Preserves national unity
4. Makes abuse procedurally difficult and legally punishable
5. This model assumes political realism, not idealism—designing institutions on the expectation that power will be abused unless restrained.

Finally, State Police should not be “governor’s police.” They must be citizens’ police under law, with governors as stakeholders—not commanders. That way, Nigerians can go to bed every  night not hoping to wake up to news of kidnapping of a close friend or relation.