The recent write-up by Y. U. Mohammed makes interesting and, in some respects, disturbing reading.
His comparison between what is happening in Nigeria and the experiences of Sudan and South Sudan deserves serious consideration. I agree with the comparison to an extent. But I do not think the Nigerian situation is sufficiently identical to either Sudan or South Sudan to justify treating the comparison as a prediction of what Nigeria must become.
Nigeria has its own history, its own political culture and, importantly, its own internal mechanisms of accommodation. Nevertheless, the warning contained in the comparison should not be dismissed.
There is something more fundamental happening in Nigeria which, in my view, requires attention.
THE PROBLEM IS BIGGER THAN TINUBU
Mohammed’s criticism of the present administration’s appointments and concentration of political power raises legitimate questions.
I agree that President Bola Ahmed Tinubu appears to have taken the politics of personal, familial, regional and political loyalty to a level that has generated considerable anxiety in parts of the country.
But I would not agree that this phenomenon began with Tinubu. We must be intellectually honest.
Previous administrations did it too. Jonathan did it in his own way. Buhari did it in his own way. Other governments before them did it in varying degrees. The important question, therefore, is not simply:
“Why is Tinubu doing this?”
The deeper question is:
“Why do Nigerian governments repeatedly develop this tendency?”
That question takes us beyond the personality of any individual president.
FROM INSTITUTIONS TO INDIVIDUALS
My explanation is that Nigeria has progressively moved from institutional security to personal security.
A properly functioning constitutional democracy is supposed to provide security through institutions.
The President does not need to personally control everybody because the Constitution, the courts, the civil service, the armed forces, the legislature, the electoral commission and other institutions provide the framework within which power operates.
A president should therefore be able to trust the system.
But what happens when institutions become weak?
What happens when constitutional safeguards become dependent upon the personalities occupying offices?
What happens when political institutions are progressively captured, weakened or personalised?
The individual in power begins to feel insecure.
And when institutional security disappears, the individual naturally looks elsewhere for protection.
He turns to people he trusts.
Family. Friends. Political associates. Ethnic group. Region and Personal networks.
This is not necessarily because every individual in power is inherently tribalistic or nepotistic.
Sometimes it is also a psychology of insecurity.
The political actor begins to think:
“Who will protect me if the institutions fail?”
The answer increasingly becomes:
“The people I know. The people who are loyal to me. The people who share my identity or interests.”
That is where the danger begins.
WHEN IDENTITY BECOMES POLITICAL SECURITY
Once political office becomes dependent upon personal networks, ethnicity and religion cease to be merely social identities.
They become political instruments.
Tribe becomes a source of political security.
Religion becomes a source of political mobilisation.
Region becomes a bargaining instrument.
Family becomes a political network.
Friends become gatekeepers.
Loyalists become institutional actors.
And public institutions gradually become extensions of private political power.
This is how a country can move, almost imperceptibly, from institutional government to personalised government.
And once that happens, every political appointment is interpreted through the lens of identity.
A competent appointment is no longer simply a competent appointment.
It is examined through the question:
“Who is he?”
“Where does he come from?”
“What religion does he practise?”
“Who does he belong to?”
“Whose interest does he represent?”
That is a dangerous transformation.
Nigeria should not be treated as Sudan.
Nigeria has survived a civil war, military coups, ethnic crises, religious conflicts, constitutional breakdowns and extraordinarily intense political competition.
Yet the country has repeatedly found ways of remaining together.
Our political system is imperfect, but it has mechanisms of negotiation that should not be underestimated.
The real danger is therefore not that Nigeria is automatically destined to become Sudan.
The danger is that if institutions continue to weaken while political identity becomes increasingly militarised and sectional, the Nigerian capacity for accommodation could eventually be overwhelmed.
That is the warning we should take seriously.
THE NIGERIAN NORTH IS NOT ONE POLITICAL COMMUNITY
There is another problem with the language commonly used in discussing Nigerian politics.
We constantly speak of “the North” as though it were a single political entity.
It is not.
There is the North-West.
There is the North-East.
There is the Middle Belt.
There are Hausa communities.
There are Fulani communities.
There are Kanuri communities.
There are numerous other ethnic nationalities.
There are northern Muslims.
There are northern Christians.
There are communities whose political interests differ substantially from those of the so-called Core North.
The expression “the North” is therefore often politically convenient rather than analytically precise.
Interestingly, the meaning of “North” can change according to who is using it and what political objective is being pursued.
When the objective is to negotiate national power, the North may suddenly become one united political bloc.
When the struggle for power becomes internal, however, the divisions become obvious:
North-West versus North-East.
Core North versus Middle Belt.
Hausa versus Fulani.
Muslim versus Christian.
And now increasingly:
Hausa versus Fulani.
These identities are not always fixed political realities.
They are often activated when they become useful.
That is one of the most important features of Nigerian identity politics.
THE SOUTH-WEST AND THE QUESTION OF POWER
The present political reality has produced another important development.
For decades, the political balance of Nigeria was heavily influenced by the old Northern political establishment.
The North, particularly the Core North and the North-West, understood the language and mechanics of national power extremely well.
That political dominance was not absolute, nor was it uninterrupted. But it was sufficiently strong to create a political expectation that national power would normally remain within the orbit of Northern influence.
The election of President Tinubu in 2023 altered that expectation.
For the first time in many years, the South-West occupies the presidency without the traditional Northern political establishment being the principal holder of national power.
That has psychological consequences.
The South-West sees this as its legitimate political opportunity.
The Core North, particularly sections of the North-West, increasingly sees the same development differently.
It may perceive a political game which it previously played very effectively now being played against it.
That is an important distinction.
Political groups rarely object to a system merely because it is unfair.
They often object when a system they once understood and controlled begins to work against them.
THE NORTH’S PRESENT DISCOMFORT SHOULD NOT BE IGNORED
The dissatisfaction emerging in parts of the North therefore deserves to be taken seriously.
It should not automatically be dismissed as an attempt by the old political establishment to regain power.
Nor should every Northern complaint be interpreted as tribal or religious agitation.
There are genuine grievances.
Economic hardship.
Insecurity.
Unemployment.
Educational deprivation.
Political exclusion.
Perceptions of unequal appointments.
Perceptions of unequal distribution of infrastructure.
Loss of political influence.
And the feeling among some Northern political elites that the political arrangement which served them for decades has now changed fundamentally.
These perceptions may be right or wrong in particular cases.
But political perceptions themselves are political facts.
A government ignores them at its peril.
THE SOUTH-EAST IS A DIFFERENT STORY
The South-East must also be understood separately.
The Nigerian Civil War left a profound historical memory.
The region recovered economically and socially in many respects, but its political relationship with the Nigerian state has remained complicated.
The separatist argument has therefore never completely disappeared.
Whether one agrees with it or not, it remains an important political variable.
The lesson is that political alienation does not always disappear merely because a country remains territorially united.
Sometimes grievances become dormant.
They can re-emerge when circumstances change.
· To be continued.
