Having examined the full judgment delivered by Hon. Justice Peter O. Lifu of the Federal High Court, Abuja, on 5 November 2026, in Suit No. FHC/ABJ/CS/1819/2025, between Hon. Nafiu Bala Gombe and the African Democratic Congress (ADC) and others, I consider it necessary to revise some aspects of my earlier commentary, which was necessarily based on information available before the judgment itself became accessible.
The actual judgment is considerably more specific than some of the reports and commentaries surrounding it. It is principally a dispute about the leadership and internal governance of the ADC, particularly the legality of the 99th National Executive Committee (NEC) meeting held on 29 July 2025, the emergence of Senator David Mark and Ogbeni Rauf Aregbesola as national officers, and the extent of INEC’s statutory responsibility in monitoring and recognising party activities.
It is important to state at the outset that the judgment did not nullify the presidential nomination of Alhaji Atiku Abubakar or the nominations of other ADC candidates. Neither Atiku’s nomination nor the validity of any particular primary election was the subject of the final orders. The Court’s orders dealt with the party’s National Working Committee, the 99th NEC meeting and the recognition of the disputed leadership. Any suggestion that the judgment has already disqualified Atiku or automatically invalidated all ADC candidates goes beyond what the Court actually decided.
The Plaintiff’s case was that he was elected Deputy National Chairman of the ADC on 12 October 2022 for a four-year tenure, and that he never resigned from that office. He challenged the emergence of the second and third Defendants as National Chairman and National Secretary, respectively, contending that their emergence was not preceded by the democratic election required by the Constitution and the Electoral Act.
The Defendants, on the other hand, relied substantially on an alleged resignation letter dated 17 May 2025, the powers of the party’s NEC under its constitution, and the notice and monitoring activities of INEC in connection with the 99th NEC meeting.
The Court rejected the preliminary objections challenging the Plaintiff’s locus standi, the justiciability of the dispute, its jurisdiction, the existence of a reasonable cause of action, alleged abuse of court process and failure to exhaust internal party remedies. The Court held that the Plaintiff had demonstrated a direct personal interest because he claimed to be an elected national officer whose tenure and position were threatened by the disputed actions.
On this point, the Court made an important distinction. A dispute does not become non-justiciable merely because it arises within a political party. Where the complaint concerns an alleged breach of constitutional or statutory requirements governing political parties, the courts retain the responsibility to determine whether the law has been complied with. The Court relied substantially on the Supreme Court’s decision in Peoples Democratic Party v Alhaji Sule Lamido & Ors, among other authorities.
I consider this an important aspect of the judgment. Political parties enjoy autonomy in managing their internal affairs, but that autonomy is not a licence to disregard the Constitution or an Act of the National Assembly. The courts should not ordinarily interfere in political choices or routine party administration. However, where a party’s conduct is alleged to violate an express statutory or constitutional obligation, the courts cannot simply decline jurisdiction by describing the matter as an internal affair.
THE ALLEGED RESIGNATION LETTER
One of the most consequential findings concerns the alleged resignation of Nafiu Bala Gombe.
The Defendants relied on a resignation letter, Exhibit ADC 1, dated 17 May 2025, as proof that the Plaintiff had voluntarily relinquished his position before the events of 29 July 2025. The Plaintiff denied signing the document and challenged its authenticity.
The Court did not accept that the mere production or certification of the document established its authenticity. It compared the disputed signature with signatures appearing on documents executed by the Plaintiff, including his witness statements on oath. It concluded that the signatures were materially different and that Exhibit ADC 1 was fictitious or fabricated. The Court consequently refused to accept the document as proof that the Plaintiff had resigned.
This finding is central to the judgment because the Defendants’ argument on locus standi and the Plaintiff’s right to challenge the new leadership depended substantially on the alleged resignation.
Our earlier concern that a disputed document could not simply be accepted without proper evidential examination remains valid. However, we must refine the argument. It would be wrong to contend that a court is invariably prohibited from comparing a disputed signature with admitted or proved signatures, or that expert evidence is compulsory in every such case. The judgment shows that the trial judge undertook a comparison and gave reasons for his conclusion.
The proper appellate question is whether the signatures used as comparison specimens were sufficiently established as genuine, whether the comparison was properly conducted, and whether the totality of the evidence justified the conclusion reached. An appellate court will have to examine the evidential foundation of this finding rather than proceed on the assumption that the judge had no power to compare the signatures.
THE 99TH NEC MEETING AND THE REQUIREMENT OF DEMOCRATIC ELECTION
This is the substantive heart of the judgment.
The Court considered Section 223(1)(a) of the 1999 Constitution, Sections 82(1), (3) and (5) of the Electoral Act 2022, and the relevant provisions of the Third Schedule to the Constitution and the Regulations and Guidelines for Political Parties.
The central question was whether the NEC could, under the ADC Constitution, dissolve the existing National Working Committee and constitute a new leadership without complying with the democratic electoral requirements imposed by the Constitution and the Electoral Act.
The Defendants relied on Article 19(14) of the ADC Constitution and the powers of the NEC between national conventions. Their position was that the NEC possessed sufficient authority to dissolve the existing NWC and constitute a new leadership.
The Court accepted that political parties have constitutional autonomy to regulate their affairs. However, it held that the exercise of such internal powers must remain subject to the Constitution and applicable legislation. In the Court’s view, the party constitution could not be interpreted or applied to displace the mandatory requirement of democratic election where the law requires one.
The Court found that there was no satisfactory evidence that the second and third Defendants emerged through a democratic election conducted in accordance with Section 82(3) of the Electoral Act. It also rejected the argument that INEC’s attendance, monitoring report or subsequent recognition of the officers could cure the absence of the required democratic process.
This is a significant legal finding. INEC’s responsibility to monitor political parties does not make the Commission the authority that creates the validity of every decision taken at a party meeting. Monitoring is not the same as conducting an election, and recognition cannot cure an otherwise unlawful process.
Nevertheless, an important question remains for appellate consideration: whether the particular exercise undertaken at the 99th NEC meeting was, in law, an election of members of an executive committee within the meaning of Section 82(3), or an exercise of the NEC’s claimed power to dissolve an existing committee and make an interim arrangement pending a properly constituted convention or election.
The answer must be found by reading the ADC Constitution alongside the Constitution of the Federal Republic and the Electoral Act. The party constitution cannot override statutory requirements, but the precise scope of the statutory requirement must also be established. The distinction between electing substantive executive officers and making an interim administrative arrangement is not one that should be ignored.
The Court’s conclusion may ultimately be upheld. However, the reasoning on this distinction deserves careful examination on appeal.
A POSSIBLE INCONSISTENCY ON NOTICE TO INEC
There is another aspect of the judgment that deserves attention.
In its consideration of the evidence, the Court referred to the notice reportedly received by INEC 25 days before the 99th NEC meeting. The Court observed that such notice might be relevant to compliance with the statutory notice requirement, but could not, by itself, establish that a democratic election had taken place.
Yet, in its third final order, the Court declared that the attendance of INEC, the issuance of its report and the recognition of the second and third Defendants were wrongful, among other reasons, because no requisite notice was given.
There may be an explanation for this distinction. Notice of a meeting is not necessarily the same as proper notice of a meeting convened for the purpose of conducting an election. Nevertheless, the judgment ought to have made that distinction clearer. If the statutory 21-day notice was in fact given, the Court should explain precisely what requirement remained unsatisfied.
This apparent tension between the reasoning and the final order is a matter that should be considered in formulating grounds of appeal.
THE MOST IMPORTANT QUESTION: THE PLAINTIFF’S TENURE HAD EXPIRED
In my view, one of the most serious questions arising from the judgment concerns the declaration that the Plaintiff was the only elected member of the ADC’s National Working Committee whose four-year tenure remained in effect and who was legally entitled to supervise the affairs of the party.
The judgment records that the Plaintiff was elected on 12 October 2022 for a four-year tenure expiring on 11 October 2026. However, the judgment was delivered on 5 November 2026.
In other words, by the date of judgment, the four-year tenure relied upon by the Plaintiff had already expired.
How, then, could the Court declare on 5 November 2026 that the Plaintiff’s four-year tenure remained in effect?
This is not a minor technical point. It goes to the legal foundation and practical operation of one of the most important declarations made by the Court. A court must consider the legal position as it exists when it delivers judgment, including relevant events that have occurred during the pendency of the proceedings.
It may have been open to the Court to determine whether the Plaintiff remained in office during the period when the disputed events occurred, or whether his rights had been unlawfully interfered with before the expiration of his tenure. That, however, is different from declaring that an expired tenure remains in effect and conferring a present entitlement to supervise the affairs of the party.
The Court should also have carefully examined the legal basis upon which the Plaintiff, as Deputy National Chairman and allegedly the only remaining elected NWC member, could assume the authority to supervise the affairs of the entire party. The right to challenge an unlawful dissolution is not necessarily identical to an automatic right to exercise all the functions of the dissolved executive committee.
This distinction deserves particular attention on appeal.
THE EFFECT OF THE FINAL ORDERS
The Court granted the principal declaratory and injunctive reliefs sought by the Plaintiff. It declared the emergence of the second and third Defendants as national officers unlawful, null and void; set aside the decisions and resolutions of the 99th NEC meeting relating to their emergence; and restrained INEC from recognising or dealing with them as officers of the ADC. It also restrained the second and third Defendants from parading themselves as officers of the party.
The Court dismissed the counterclaim of the third Defendant and made no order as to costs.
These orders have serious implications for the leadership and administration of the ADC. They cannot be treated as inconsequential. But they must also be read according to their actual scope. The Court did not set aside a presidential primary, invalidate Atiku Abubakar’s nomination, or declare any other ADC candidate ineligible.
The practical consequences for the party’s subsequent activities will depend on the legal authority of the persons who conducted or authorised those activities, the terms of the judgment, and any subsequent appellate orders. A separate legal challenge may arise where a particular decision is shown to depend on the authority of officers restrained by the judgment. That possibility should not be confused with an automatic nullification of all the party’s subsequent decisions.
WHAT SHOULD BE CONSIDERED ON APPEAL?
In my assessment, the judgment raises substantial questions that deserve appellate examination. They include:

Whether the Court was right to declare that the Plaintiff’s four-year tenure remained in effect when the tenure had expired before judgment was delivered.

Whether the Plaintiff’s status as the only remaining elected NWC member automatically entitled him to supervise the affairs of the entire party.

Whether the Court properly interpreted Section 82(3) of the Electoral Act in relation to the NEC’s claimed power to dissolve the NWC and constitute an interim leadership arrangement.

Whether the Court’s treatment of the notice given to INEC is consistent with the wording and legal effect of its final orders.

Whether the finding that the resignation letter was fabricated was adequately supported by the documentary evidence and the comparison of signatures undertaken by the trial judge.

Whether the declaratory and injunctive orders were properly framed, having regard to the precise rights established and the legal consequences of the Plaintiff’s expired tenure.

These are not arguments that automatically establish that the judgment must be set aside. They are questions of law and fact that an appellate court should examine against the complete record of proceedings, the ADC Constitution, the Electoral Act and the applicable constitutional provisions.
Our earlier reference to the judgment of Justice Musa Liman and the Supreme Court proceedings in the leadership dispute should also be treated with care. Justice Lifu’s judgment does not appear to have undertaken a substantive analysis of those decisions or their possible effect on the issues before him. We should therefore not assert that he disregarded or violated their binding effect without examining the relevant proceedings, the issues decided, the parties and the extent to which the earlier decisions were properly placed before him.
CONCLUSION
Having read the actual judgment, I would not dismiss it as a mere judicial interference in the internal affairs of a political party. The Court made a serious attempt to distinguish legitimate party autonomy from the obligation to obey the Constitution and the Electoral Act. Its insistence that INEC’s monitoring and recognition cannot substitute for a legally required democratic election is an important principle in the development of democratic party administration in Nigeria.
At the same time, the judgment is not beyond criticism. The issue of the Plaintiff’s expired tenure, the legal foundation for his claimed authority to supervise the party, the interpretation of the NEC’s powers, and the apparent inconsistency concerning notice to INEC are matters that require careful appellate scrutiny.
My earlier commentary was written before the actual judgment was available. Some of its concerns remain relevant, but the argument about the direct nullification of Atiku Abubakar’s nomination and other candidates must be withdrawn. The judgment made no such order.
The real issue is not whether the Court has disqualified ADC candidates. It has not. The real issue is whether the Court correctly interpreted the constitutional and statutory requirements governing the emergence of the ADC’s national leadership, and whether the consequential orders it made are legally sustainable.
Ultimately, political parties cannot place themselves above the law. Equally, courts must ensure that their judgments remain within the boundaries of the law, the evidence before them and the reliefs properly established by the parties.
That is the balance which the appellate courts will now be called upon to examine.