By Group Captain Sadeeq Garba Shehu (rtd)

Five days after the tragic crash of the Nigerian Air Force ATR-42 aircraft at Igbokoda, Ondo State on October 5, 2026, recovery teams have continued their difficult efforts to locate and retrieve the main wreckage from the swampy terrain.

My thoughts remain with the families of the 25 persons reported aboard the aircraft and with the courageous personnel involved in the recovery operation.

But as we mourn, I believe we must ask some difficult professional questions. And history provides an uncomfortable reason for asking them.

ON 26 SEPTEMBER 1992, A NIGERIAN AIR FORCE C-130 HERCULES CRASHED INTO A SWAMP AT EJIGBO, LAGOS.

The tragedy claimed the lives of some of the finest officers of the Nigerian Armed Forces. The subsequent recovery operation exposed serious limitations in our emergency response and specialised recovery capabilities. Historical accounts record that rescuers initially worked with rudimentary tools, while private companies, including Westminster Dredging and Julius Berger, eventually provided specialised assistance and heavy equipment.

That was thirty-four years ago.

Fast-forward to October 2026. Another military aircraft crashes into swampy terrain. Once again, specialised equipment, including sonar systems and amphibious excavators, has become central to the search and recovery effort.

To be clear, I do not suggest that nothing has improved since 1992. Indeed, the deployment of Nigerian Navy sonar equipment and specialist personnel demonstrates capabilities that deserve acknowledgement.

Nevertheless, 34 years after Ejigbo, are we satisfied that we have developed the comprehensive, rapidly deployable search and recovery capability that a country of Nigeria’s size and military experience ought to possess?

A SWAMP IS NOT AN OCEAN. SHOULD RECOVERY NOT BE EASIER?

There is another point worth considering. We are talking about a swamp, not the open ocean or a fast-flowing river. Ordinarily, one would expect the absence of significant waves, strong currents and large-scale water movement to reduce some of the difficulties associated with locating submerged wreckage. Unlike an aircraft lost at sea, the general area of impact may also be relatively confined.

That said, swamps present their own formidable challenges: deep mud, submerged vegetation, near-zero underwater visibility, unstable ground and difficulty deploying heavy recovery equipment. Wreckage may become deeply embedded in soft sediment. I therefore recognise that recovery may still be technically demanding.

Nevertheless, the question remains legitimate: If locating and recovering an aircraft from a relatively confined swamp environment presents such difficulties, how adequately prepared are we for an aircraft accident in deeper waters, offshore or in other equally challenging environments?

This is not a criticism of the recovery personnel. It is a question about the adequacy of the national capability available to support them.

AN IMPORTANT WARNING WE SHOULD NOT OVERLOOK

On 20 August 2026, the Nigerian Tribune published a particularly revealing warning from Captain Alex Badeh Jr., Director-General of the Nigerian Safety Investigation Bureau. Speaking about inadequate funding and specialised underwater accident investigation equipment, he disclosed that his agency had sought assistance from the Nigerian Navy but discovered that it lacked a Remotely Operated Vehicle (ROV).

He explained the difficulties of conducting underwater investigations in Nigeria’s extremely murky waterways and the importance of acquiring such equipment.

This warning was published barely six weeks before the present tragedy.

I am not suggesting that an ROV alone would have prevented the present recovery difficulties. Nor does the statement establish that no other military or commercial institution possesses suitable equipment.

But it raises a fundamental question about whether identified capability gaps are being systematically addressed before emergencies occur.

WHAT SHOULD NIGERIA HAVE?

A modern military aviation Search and Rescue and Search and Recovery capability should include:

1. Specialised aerial search platforms: Helicopters and surveillance aircraft equipped with electro-optical and infrared sensors, searchlights, GPS and other equipment for locating survivors and wreckage.

2. Modern underwater detection systems: Side-scan sonar, multibeam echo sounders, underwater locator beacon detectors and associated technologies capable of identifying submerged aircraft structures in poor visibility.

3. Remotely Operated Underwater Vehicles (ROVs): Underwater robotic systems equipped with imaging sonar, cameras, lights and manipulator arms for inspecting submerged wreckage where divers face serious limitations.

4. Specialised wreckage recovery equipment: Cranes, winches, lifting systems, shallow-draft vessels, amphibious recovery platforms and other equipment appropriate for rivers, swamps and difficult terrain.

5. Trained specialist personnel: Rescue swimmers, military divers, underwater search technicians, forensic recovery teams, aviation accident investigators and medical evacuation personnel.

6. Integrated command and coordination: Clear arrangements for rapidly mobilising the Air Force, Navy, relevant civilian agencies and specialised private-sector resources under an effective operational coordination structure.

Not all this equipment must necessarily belong to the Nigerian Air Force. What matters is that the country possesses, maintains or has guaranteed rapid access to the necessary capabilities.

SEARCH AND RESCUE IS NOT SEARCH AND RECOVERY

There is also an important professional distinction which I explained in an earlier post.

Search and Rescue is primarily concerned with locating and saving survivors. Search and Recovery concerns the retrieval of human remains, aircraft wreckage, flight recorders and other evidence when rescue is no longer possible.

Both demand specialist equipment, trained personnel and established procedures.

Recovery operations must also preserve the integrity of accident investigations. The location of wreckage, distribution of debris and condition of recovered components may hold vital clues about the circumstances of the accident.

A poorly conducted recovery can inadvertently compromise the very evidence needed to prevent another tragedy.

The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) framework also recognises the importance of preserving and documenting aircraft wreckage during recovery. Wreckage should not be moved or disturbed unnecessarily before the appropriate investigation authority has examined and recorded it, except where action is required to rescue survivors, protect the public or prevent further damage. This is why recovery operations must be carefully coordinated with accident investigators and conducted in a manner that protects both human remains and critical evidence.

WHAT LESSONS HAVE WE LEARNED?

I believe the Armed Forces and relevant civilian institutions should undertake a comprehensive post-operation review of our national aviation Search, Rescue and Recovery preparedness.

Such a review should establish:

– What specialised equipment is available nationally, where it is located and whether it is serviceable.

– How quickly equipment and trained personnel can be deployed to a crash site.

– Whether identified gaps, including those publicly highlighted by Captain Badeh Jr., have been addressed.

– Whether the Armed Forces possess adequate underwater search, inspection and recovery capabilities.

– Whether existing inter-agency arrangements and contingency contracts guarantee timely access to specialised private-sector equipment.

– Whether realistic joint search and recovery exercises are conducted regularly, with lessons properly documented and implemented.

I would particularly recommend a nationally coordinated, rapidly deployable aviation Search, Rescue and Recovery capability, supported by clear institutional responsibilities, appropriate funding and regular joint training.

The Nigerian Air Force, Nigerian Navy, emergency management institutions and relevant civilian technical agencies should all have defined roles.

MY FINAL THOUGHT

The men and women undertaking the present recovery operation deserve our respect. They are working in difficult and potentially dangerous conditions, and their dedication should not be confused with the adequacy or otherwise of the equipment placed at their disposal.

Indeed, that distinction is central to my concern.

We cannot continue to expect courage, improvisation and individual determination to substitute for institutional preparedness.

In 1992, we needed outside specialised assistance to recover the wreckage of a military aircraft from a swamp.

In August 2026, the head of our national safety investigation agency publicly identified a significant gap in underwater recovery technology.

In October 2026, another military aircraft tragedy has again brought the challenges of recovery in difficult terrain into sharp focus.

The circumstances of the two accidents are not identical, and it would be unfair to draw conclusions about the current operation before a proper technical assessment.

Nevertheless, the historical parallels should compel us to ask whether lessons identified have consistently become lessons implemented.

The true measure of institutional learning is not the number of investigation reports produced after an accident. It is the number of identified deficiencies corrected before the next one.

We owe the departed and their families more than condolences and ceremonial honours.

We owe them a system that learns, improves and prepares.

Group Captain Sadeeq Garba Shehu (rtd) is a Security & Defence Analyst/Conflict Security & Development Consult Ltd